victim application
BertRLFuzzer: A BERT and Reinforcement Learning Based Fuzzer
Jha, Piyush, Scott, Joseph, Ganeshna, Jaya Sriram, Singh, Mudit, Ganesh, Vijay
We present a novel tool BertRLFuzzer, a BERT and Reinforcement Learning (RL) based fuzzer aimed at finding security vulnerabilities for Web applications. BertRLFuzzer works as follows: given a set of seed inputs, the fuzzer performs grammar-adhering and attack-provoking mutation operations on them to generate candidate attack vectors. The key insight of BertRLFuzzer is the use of RL with a BERT model as an agent to guide the fuzzer to efficiently learn grammar-adhering and attack-provoking mutation operators. In order to establish the efficacy of BertRLFuzzer we compare it against a total of 13 black box and white box fuzzers over a benchmark of 9 victim websites with over 16K LOC. We observed a significant improvement relative to the nearest competing tool in terms of time to first attack (54% less), new vulnerabilities found (17 new vulnerabilities), and attack rate (4.4% more attack vectors generated).
Defensive ML: Defending Architectural Side-channels with Adversarial Obfuscation
Nam, Hyoungwook, Pothukuchi, Raghavendra Pradyumna, Li, Bo, Kim, Nam Sung, Torrellas, Josep
Side-channel attacks that use machine learning (ML) for signal analysis have become prominent threats to computer security, as ML models easily find patterns in signals. To address this problem, this paper explores using Adversarial Machine Learning (AML) methods as a defense at the computer architecture layer to obfuscate side channels. We call this approach Defensive ML, and the generator to obfuscate signals, defender. Defensive ML is a workflow to design, implement, train, and deploy defenders for different environments. First, we design a defender architecture given the physical characteristics and hardware constraints of the side-channel. Next, we use our DefenderGAN structure to train the defender. Finally, we apply defensive ML to thwart two side-channel attacks: one based on memory contention and the other on application power. The former uses a hardware defender with ns-level response time that attains a high level of security with half the performance impact of a traditional scheme; the latter uses a software defender with ms-level response time that provides better security than a traditional scheme with only 70% of its power overhead.